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Abstract
We introduce knowledge flow analysis, a simple and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic
protocols. Knowledge flows provide a uniform language for expressing the actions of principals, assump-
tions about intruders, and the properties of cryptographic primitives. Our approach enables a generalized
two-phase analysis: we extend the two-phase theory by identifying the necessary and sufficient proper-
ties of a broad class of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We also contribute a library
of standard primitives and show that they satisfy our criteria.
keywords: security protocols, intruder detection.
1 Introduction
One area of major successes for formal methods has been the verification of security protocols. A number of
specialized tools have been developed in the last decade that have exposed subtle flaws in existing protocols
(see, e.g. [27, 11]). Many of these tools [10, 11, 15] use a two-phase approach to efficiently identify intrusion
scenarios.
This paper presents knowledge flow analysis, a lightweight and flexible formalism for checking crypto-
graphic protocols. Our approach is based on a simple mathematical foundation that provides an extensible
framework for two-phase analysis. In particular, we generalize the two-phase theory of Clarke et al [10]
by identifying the properties of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We demonstrate the
generality of our criteria by using them to build a library of standard cryptographic primitives: public and
symmetric encryption/decryption, signing, pair/set construction, nonce generation, and hashing. The sample
library can be extended to include blind signing, certification, and many other functions from the rich class
of primitives that satisfy our criteria.
Our approach gives a uniform formalism for expressing the actions of principals, assumptions on in-
truders, and properties of cryptographic primitives. The dynamic behavior of the protocol is described by
an initial state of knowledge, and a collection of rules that dictate how knowledge may flow amongst prin-
cipals. Protocol rules are embedded into the initial state of knowledge as values that can be composed and
decomposed by a special rule primitive, which satisfies the two-phase criteria.
The knowledge flow approach grew out of an effort to check a new cryptographic scheme [19, 18].
Knowledge flow analysis described here was the final result of a series of incremental attempts at formalizing
and checking their assumptions using the Alloy language and tool [24, 23]. This process drew out the
single source axiom which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been described before: the security of
cryptographic functions depends on the assumption that their fixed points are hard to compute.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the key intuitions underlying the
approach, using the Needham-Schroeder protocol [34] as an example. Section 3 gives the mathematical
foundations of the approach. Section 4 formulates and proves the two-phase theory in the knowledge flow
context. Section 5 provides a mathematical characterization of the primitives to which the two-phase theory
applies. Section 6 presents a sample subset of these primitives. The paper closes with a discussion of related
work and concluding remarks.
2 Knowledge Flow Basics
The key idea behind knowledge flow analysis is the observation that, at the most basic level, the purpose of
a security protocol is to distribute knowledge among its legitimate participants. A protocol is flawed if it
allows an intruder to learn a value that is intended to remain strictly within the legitimate principals’ pool
of knowledge. To gain more intuition about knowledge flows in security applications, consider the original
Needham-Schroeder protocol [34]:
1. Alice transmits EPK(B)(IA, NA) to Bob
2. Bob transmits EPK(A)(NA, NB) to Alice
3. Alice transmits EPK(B)(NB) to Bob.
We have two principals, Alice and Bob, each of whom has an initial supply of knowledge. Alice’s initial
knowledge, for example, consists of her own public/private key pair PK(A)/SK(A), identity IA, nonce
NA, and Bob’s public key PK(B) and identity IB . The purpose of the protocol is to distribute the nonces
between Alice and Bob in such a way that the following conditions hold at the end: (i) Alice and Bob both
know NA and NB , and (ii) no other principal knows both nonces.
To initiate the protocol, Alice first expands her pool of knowledge to include EPK(B)(IA, NA), an en-
cryption of her identity and nonce with Bob’s public key. She then sends the cipher to Bob who decrypts it
using his private key, SK(B). At the end of the first step of the protocol, Bob’s knowledge has increased
to include the values EPK(B)(IA, NA) and NA. Bob performs the second step of the protocol by adding
EPK(A)(NA, NB) to his current knowledge and sending the cipher to Alice. She uses her private key to
decrypt Bob’s message and extract NB . By using NB and PK(B), Alice can set up an authenticated and
private channel with Bob as is done during the final step of the protocol in which Alice creates EPK(B)(NB)
and forwards it to Bob. Both Alice and Bob now know the two nonces and share all the knowledge except
their secret keys.
Following the flow of knowledge in the Needham-Schroeder protocol provides a crucial insight under-
lying our analysis method. Namely, a principal can learn a value in one of three ways; he can
· draw the value at the start,
· compute it using his current knowledge, or
· learn it by communication.
Our analysis treats the latter two ways of obtaining knowledge as equivalent. Specifically, we can think of
Alice’s computing EPK(B)(IA, NA) as her learning it from a principal called Encryptor whose initial pool of
values includes all possible ciphers: Alice sends the tuple (PK(B), (IA, NA)) to Encryptor who responds
by sending back the encryption of (IA, NA) with PK(B).
Treating cryptographic primitives as principals allows us to consider the total pool of knowledge to be
fixed. That is, the set of all values before and after the execution of a security protocol is the same; the only
difference is the distribution of those values among the principals. Since we assume that principals never
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forget values, the set of principals who know a value at the end of a protocol session subsumes the set of
principals who drew the value at the beginning.
The goal of analyzing knowledge flows in a protocol is to verify that particular values never leak out of
the honest participants’ pool of knowledge. In other words, we are interested in analyzing the flow of knowl-
edge from an intruder’s perspective. This observation allows us to make sound simplifying assumptions that
drastically reduce the effort needed to formalize a protocol in terms of knowledge flows:
· We need not encode the flows of knowledge among the honest principals, such as the flow which
allows Alice to learn EPK(A)(NA, NB) from Encryptor. Rather, we may assume that each honest
principal draws all values in the total knowledge pool and specify protocols solely in terms of the
intruders’ knowledge flows (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
· We may model all adversaries, including the untrusted public network, with a single opponent whom
we call Oscar. The soundness of this approach is formally proved in section 3.3. Intuitively, the ap-
proach makes sense if we note that the potential adversaries will be most effective when they collabo-
rate and share knowledge among themselves. Hence, we can replace the (collaboration of) adversaries
with a single principal who possesses all their knowledge, without excluding any intrusion scenarios.
In our example, the flow of knowledge from the intruder’s perspective starts with the protocol initial-
ization message EPK(B)(IA, NA), since Oscar needs no prior knowledge to learn the first cipher that Alice
sends to Bob. In general, because Oscar includes the untrusted public network, he learns the first message
of the protocol for free, regardless of who its intended recipient and sender are:
∀p∈{a,b},p′∈{a,b}∪O [∅ → EPK(p′)(I(p),N (ǫ,I(p)))]. (1)
The variables a and b denote the honest principals (Alice and Bob), and the set O stands for Oscar. The
notation N (ǫ,I(p)) represents the nonce that the nonce primitive generated for the principal identified
by I(p) using the random value ǫ as the seed. For example, Alice’s identity is I(a) = IA and Al-
ice’s nonce is N (ǫ,I(a)) = NA. The empty set means that Oscar needs no prior knowledge to learn
EPK(p′)(I(p),N (ǫ,I(p))).
Once his pool of knowledge includes EPK(B)(IA, NA), Oscar learns the corresponding response,
EPK(A)(NA, NB). More generally1 ,
∀p′∈{a,b},p∈{a,b}∪O,v∈V
[
{c} → EPK(p)(v,N (c,I(p
′)))
]
where c = EPK(p′)(I(p), v). (2)
The variable V denotes the set of all values, or the fixed pool of knowledge. Note that our formalization
constrains the seed of Bob’s nonce to be Alice’s initialization message. This is needed to establish that
Bob’s nonce was generated in the context of the protocol session started by Alice with EPK(B)(IA, NA).
The resulting correspondence between the nonces prevents our analysis from sounding false alarms when
Oscar legitimately obtains two nonces from Alice and Bob by running a valid protocol session with each.
Oscar learns the final message, EPK(B)(NB), as a consequence of knowing EPK(A)(NA, NB). Formally,
∀p∈{a,b},p′∈{a,b}∪O,v∈V
[
{EPK(p)(N (ǫ,I(p)), v))} → EPK(p′)(v)
]
. (3)
3 Knowledge Flow Analysis
Knowledge flow analysis is based on a simple mathematical foundation. This section formalizes the ideas
outlined in the discussion of knowledge flow basics. We describe how communication rules direct knowl-
edge flows (3.1), show that our treatment of primitives ensures a fixed pool of values (3.2), and formulate
the analysis problem in terms of Oscar’s knowledge flows (3.3).
1We use the parameter v in c instead of N (ǫ, I(p)) because p′, the recipient of c, cannot conclusively determine that v is, in
fact, the nonce N (ǫ, I(p)).
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3.1 Communicating Knowledge
We denote the sets of all principals and values by P and V . A subset of P × V is a state of knowledge
drawn from K = 2P×V , the set of all possible states of knowledge. For a given state of knowledge k ∈ K ,
we say that “p knows v” if (p, v) ∈ k.
Definition 1 A tuple (R, k0) is a knowledge flow for (P, V ) directed by the communication rules R ⊆
P × V × P ×K and originating from the state k0 ∈ K .
A communication rule describes the conditions under which one principal may gain knowledge from an-
other. For example, the rule (e, EPK(pb)(v), pa, {(pa,PK(pb)), (pa, v)}) states that the encryptor e will tell
the cipher EPK(b)(v) to the principal pa if pa knows pb’s public key and the plaintext v.
Note that our definition of a communication rule limits the class of protocols expressible in the knowl-
edge flow framework. In particular, our rules cannot be used to specify conditions under which information
is withheld from a principal, such as “a will not tell v to b if b knows x”. To the best of our knowledge, no
protocol proposed for practical use requires this form of expressiveness.
Given a set of communication rules R, we say that k′ ∈ K is reachable from k ∈ K via R if k′ is the
result of applying all rules in R to k at most once; i.e. k′ = fR(k) where
Definition 2 fR : K −→ K such that
fR(k) = k ∪
{
(pa, v) :
(pb, v) ∈ k, ka ⊆ k, and (pb, v, pa, ka) ∈ R,
for some pb ∈ P and ka ∈ K
}
.
A state of knowledge kn is reachable in the context of a knowledge flow (R, k0) if kn = fnR(k0). The
maximal state of knowledge f∗R(k0) is the limit of kn = fnR(k0) as n → ∞. A state of knowledge f∗Rκ(κ)
is valid for a knowledge flow (R, k0) if Rκ ⊆ R and κ ⊆ k0. Since fR(k0) is monotonically increasing in
R and k0, any valid state of knowledge is a subset of the maximal state of knowledge. Hence, the maximal
state of knowledge is also the smallest fixed point of fR which subsumes k0. It is evident from Definition 2
that self-rules such as r = (p, v, p, kp) ∈ R do not affect the flow of knowledge: fR(k) = fR−{r}(k). We
therefore assume that R does not contain any self-rules.
3.2 Initial Knowledge
For each value v, Source(v) = {p : (p, v) ∈ k0} defines the set of principals who draw v. In the knowledge
flow framework, a principal p outside of Source(v) can learn v only by communicating with principals
who know v. We therefore treat cryptographic primitives, and other computationally feasible algorithms,
as principals. For example, suppose that, in practice, p can compute v by applying the algorithm A to
inputs i1, i2, . . . , in. We model A by adding the principal A to P , the tuple (A, v) to k0, and the rule
(A, v, p, {(p, i1), (p, i2), . . . (p, in)}) to R.
Our treatment of primitives ensures that Knowledge(k0) = {v : (p, v) ∈ k0 for some p ∈ P} consists
of all learnable values. Hence, V is the same in the initial and the maximal state of knowledge,
Knowledge(k0) = Knowledge(f
∗
R(k0)), (4)
which implies that we can safely restrict our analysis to the subset of R which only involves values in
Knowledge(k0).
We further simplify our approach by constraining k0, and therefore R, according to standard security
assumptions. Specifically, we assume the single source axiom for values that are fixed points of cryp-
tographic functions. For example, if the primitive h models a hashing function H, then we assume that
{h} = Source(x) for all x such that x = H(x). We thus model the assumption that solving the equation
x = H(x) is computationally hard by stating that no principal other than h can draw x:
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Definition 3 (Single Source Axiom) Set Fp is fixed for a principal p if for each (p, v, pa, ka) ∈ R with
v ∈ Fp, there exists an x ∈ Fp such that (pa, x) ∈ ka. Fixed sets Fp for p ∈ P satisfy the single-source
axiom if, for all p ∈ P , pa ∈ P , and v ∈ V , [v ∈ Fp and (pa, v) ∈ k0]⇒ [p = pa].
The consequence of the single-source axiom is that no principal outside of {p} = Source(v) can ever
learn v ∈ Fp:
Lemma 4 If the fixed sets Fp for p ∈ P satisfy the single-source axiom, then, for all p ∈ P , pa ∈ P , and
v ∈ V , [v ∈ Fp and (pa, v) ∈ fnR(k0)]⇒ [p = pa and (pa, v) ∈ k0].
Proof. We use induction on n. The case n = 0 is equivalent to the single-source axiom. Suppose that the
lemma holds for n, our induction hypothesis. Let v ∈ Fp and (pa, v) ∈ fn+1R (k0). According to Definition
2, (i) (pa, v) ∈ fnR(k0) and the lemma follows from the induction hypothesis, or (ii) there exists a pb ∈ P and
ka ∈ K such that (pb, v) ∈ fnR(k0), ka ⊆ fnR(k0), and (pb, v, pa, ka) ∈ R. From the induction hypothesis
we infer that p = pb and (pb, v) ∈ k0 since v ∈ Fp and (pb, v) ∈ fnR(k0). Hence, (p, v, pa, ka) ∈ R and,
since v ∈ Fp and Fp is a fixed set for p, there exists an x ∈ Fp such that (pa, x) ∈ ka ⊆ fnR(k0), which
proves p = pa by the induction hypothesis. Notice that (pa, v) ∈ k0 because pa = p = pb and (pb, v) ∈ k0.
The lemma follows by induction on n.

Together with Equation (4), Lemma 4 implies that f∗RF (k0) = f∗R(k0) ⊆ k0 ∪ [P × (Knowledge(k0)−
F )], where F is the union of all Fp and
RF = {(pb, x, pa, ka) ∈ R : {(pb, x)} ∪ ka ⊆ k0 ∪ [P × (Knowledge(k0)− F )]} .
Hence, we need to analyze only the knowledge flows characterized by RF .
3.3 Adversaries’ Knowledge
Let O ⊆ P be a group of collaborating adversaries. We collapse O into a single principal o using the
following merging function:
Merge(p) =
{
o if p ∈ O,
p if p 6∈ O
Merge(k) = {(Merge(p), v) : (p, v) ∈ k}
Merge(r) = (Merge(pb), v,Merge(pa),Merge(ka)) where r = (pb, v, pa, ka) ∈ R
The merging of adversaries does not rule out any attacks because Merge(f∗R(k0)) ⊆
f∗
Merge(R)(Merge(k0)). We subsequently assume that Merge is implied and use P , R, and k0 to
refer to Merge(P ), Merge(R), and Merge(k0).
Security properties of protocols are expressed as predicates on the values known to Oscar in the maximal
state of knowledge. We therefore focus our analysis of knowledge flows to finding all the values in the
projection of f∗RF (k0) on Oscar. Specifically, we introduce the projection function g and show that its
smallest fixed point is the image of Oscar under f∗RF (k0).
Definition 5 Let X → x or, more explicitly, X →p x denote the existence of a rule (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ RF for
some p ∈ P − {o} and kσ ∈ K with X = {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ}. We define g : 2V −→ 2V as
g(X) = X ∪ {x : Xσ → x for some Xσ ⊆ X} .
The set of values reachable from X is given by g∗(X), which is the limit of gn(X) as n→∞.
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Since fR(k0) is monotonically increasing in R, Oscar’s pool of values under f∗R(k0) is maximized if
(a) Oscar tells everything he knows to the honest principals and (b) the honest principals tell each other
all values learnable in polynomial time–which, in our framework, are the values in Knowledge(k0) − F .
Formally, Oscar’s final knowledge is maximized when [(P − {o}) × (Knowledge(k0) − F )] ⊆ f∗R(k0).
This is equivalent to assuming that [(P −{o})× (Knowledge(k0)−F )] ⊆ k0 because k ⊆ f∗R(k0) implies
that f∗R(k0) = f∗R(k0 ∪ k).
Theorem 6 (Knowledge Flow Analysis) Let [(P − {o}) × (Knowledge(k0) − F )] ⊆ k0 and let kn =
fnR(k0). Then the set Xn = {v : (o, v) ∈ kn} has the property that Xn = gn(X0).
Proof. We use induction on n. For n = 0, Xn = X0 = gn(X0). Let Xn = gn(X0), our induction
hypothesis. We now need to prove that Xn+1 = gn+1(X0). By the definition of Xn+1, x ∈ Xn+1 ⇐⇒
(o, x) ∈ kn+1 = fR(kn). According to Definition 2, (o, x) ∈ fR(kn) if and only if (i) (o, x) ∈ kn,
which is equivalent to x ∈ Xn, or (ii) there exists a p ∈ P and kσ ∈ K such that (p, x) ∈ kn, kσ ⊆
kn, and (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ R. Since there are no self-rules (o, v, o, kσ) ∈ R, we know that p ∈ P − {o}.
Since [(P − {o}) × (Knowledge(k0) − F )] ⊆ k0 ⊆ kn, (p, x) ∈ kn if and only if (p, x) ∈ k0 ∪ [P ×
(Knowledge(k0) − F )] by Lemma 4. This argument also proves that the condition kσ ⊆ kn is equivalent
to
Xσ = {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ} ⊆ {v : (o, v) ∈ kn} = Xn and kσ ⊆ k0 ∪ [P × (Knowledge(k0)− F )].
Notice that {(p, x)} ∪ kσ ⊆ k0 ∪ [P × (Knowledge(k0)−F )] gives us (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ RF . Therefore, case
ii) holds if and only if there exists a set Xσ ⊆ Xn such that Xσ → x. By Definition 5, case (i) or case (ii)
holds if and only if x ∈ g(Xn). Hence, Xn+1 = g(Xn) and the theorem follows by induction on n.

4 Two-Phase Theory
The formalism developed in the previous sections enables a systematic and efficient analysis of Oscar’s
knowledge flows. Specifically, Oscar’s final pool of values can be computed in two phases by first applying
all the decomposing rules in R and then all the composing ones. This is a consequence of the ‘two-phase
theory’ [15, 10], which we now formulate and prove in the knowledge flow framework.
Intuitively, a composing rule combines its inputs into an output value from which some or all of the
inputs can be extracted using a corresponding decomposing rule, if one exists. For example, the composing
rule rz = {x, y} →p x + iy, where x 6= 0 and y 6= 0, combines the non-zero real numbers x and
y into the complex number x + iy. The corresponding decomposing rules, rx = {x + iy} →p x and
ry = {x + iy} →p y, reconstruct the inputs to rz from its output. Formally, we define composing and
decomposing rules as follows:
Definition 7 Let p be a principal with a partial ordering ≺p on the set of values V . We call X →p x
• composing, if X ≺p x, that is, v ≺p x for all v ∈ X, and
• decomposing, if there exists a value v ∈ X with x ≺p v such that x ∈ X ′ for all composing X ′ →p v.
We say that v controlsp x.
Principal p is composing/decomposing if there exists a partial ordering ≺p such that for all X ⊆ V and
x ∈ V , X →p x is composing or decomposing.
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Our definition permits the images of composing rules of different principals to intersect. In practice,
however, such intersections are hard to compute; that is, equations like H(z) = Ek(x), where H is a hashing
and E an encryption function, cannot be solved in polynomial time. We model this by assuming that the
images of different principals’ composing rules are disjoint:
Definition 8 (Global Collision Free Axiom) Orderings ≺p are globally collision free if the sets {v :
∃x [x ≺p v]} have empty intersections for different p.
By Definition 7, the set {v : ∃x [x ≺p v]} is the image of the composing rules of a compos-
ing/decomposing principal p. Hence, the global collision free axiom gives us the required condition that
[X →p v is composing and X ′ →p′ v is composing] ⇒ [p = p′] for all p and p′ in P , X and X ′ in V , and
v ∈ V .
The two phase theory (Theorem 9) follows immediately from Definitions 7 and 8. It states that applying
a decomposing rule after a corresponding composing rule yields no new information. We can therefore
derive Oscar’s maximal state of knowledge in a minimal number of steps by applying all the decomposing
rules before their composing counterparts.
Theorem 9 (Two-Phase Theory) Suppose that the orderings of principals in P−{o} are globally collision
free: If X → x is decomposing, v controls x, v ∈ X, X ′ 6= ∅, and X ′ → v is composing, then x ∈ X ′.
Proof. Suppose that v controlsp x, X ′ 6= ∅, and X ′ →p′ v is composing. Since v controlsp x, x ≺p v and
since X ′ →p′ v is composing, there exists a value x′ such that x′ ≺p′ v. The orderings ≺p and ≺p′ are
globally collision free, therefore p′ = p. By the definition of v controlsp x, x ∈ X ′ because X ′ →p v is
composing.

5 Composing/Decomposing Principals
The applicability of the two-phase theory is not restricted by its formulation in terms of com-
posing/decomposing principals. This section presents a general criterion for identifying compos-
ing/decomposing principals which we use in the next section to demonstrate that both standard cryptographic
primitives and protocol rules are composing/decomposing in our framework.
We represent composing and decomposing rules with locally collision free sets. This representation
ensures that each decomposing rule has a corresponding composing rule (5) and that the composing rules
are locally free of collisions (6)—i.e., for all p in P , all X and X ′ subsets of V , and all v ∈ V , [X →p
v is composing and X ′ →p v is composing]⇒ [X = X ′].
Definition 10 (Local Collision Free Axiom) A set S ⊆ V m is locally collision free if there exist sets C
and D, which are subsets of {1, . . . ,m}, such that there exist subsets Wi ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, i ∈ C ∪D, with
the following properties:
for all i ∈ D there exists a h ∈ C such that h ∈Wi and i ∈Wh (5)
and
for all i, t ∈ C and for all (x1, . . . , xm), (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ S,
if xi = yt then {xj : j ∈Wi} = {yj : j ∈Wt}. (6)
The image Im(S) of S is defined as the set of values xi for some (x1, . . . , xi, . . . xm) ∈ S such that i ∈ C .
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An example of a locally collision free set is
S = {(s,G(s), x, EG(s)(x),Ss(x)) : s, x ∈ V } ⊆ V
5,
where G, E , and S are injective functions free of collisions; that is, G(v) 6= EG(s)(x), G(v) 6= Ss(x), and
EG(s)(x) 6= Sv(y) for all s, v, x, and y in V . Let D = {3} indicate the position in the tuples in S which
correspond to x and let C = {2, 4, 5} indicate the positions which correspond to G(s), EG(s)(x), and Ss(x).
Let W3 = {1, 4}, W2 = {1}, W4 = {2, 3}, and W5 = {1, 3}. Since G, E , and S are injective functions
with disjoint images, S satisfies (6). Condition (5) is satisfied by taking h = 4 ∈ C and i = 3 ∈ D.
The following theorem shows how a local collision free set leads to a composing/decomposing principal.
Its proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 11 (Composing/Decomposing) Let p ∈ P − {o} be a principal such that
(p, v, pa, ka) ∈ R implies
there exists an i ∈ C ∪D and (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S such that
v = xi, ka = {(pa, xj) : j ∈Wi}, (7)
where S is local collision free with respect toC ,D, and Wi, i ∈ C∪D. Let Fp be the maximal2 fixed set with
Fp ⊆ Im(S). Then, p is composing/decomposing; composing rules correspond to i ∈ C and decomposing
rules correspond to i ∈ D. The image of the composing rules is {v : ∃x∈V [x ≺p v]} ⊆ Im(S).
Applying Theorem 11 to our example, we define the encryptor/decryptor/signer e by the
decomposing rule (e, x, p, {(p, s), (p, EG(s)(x))}) and the composing rules (e,G(s), p, {(p, s)}),
(e, EG(s)(x), p, {(p,G(s)), (p, x)}) and (e,Ss(x), p, {(p, s), (p, x)}). The decomposing rule corresponds
to the position 3 ∈ D and models decryption; the composing rules correspond to the positions 2 ∈ C ,
4 ∈ C , and 5 ∈ C and model public key generation, encryption, and signing. The principal e is therefore
composing/decomposing, and the two-phase theory holds for E , G, and S .
The composing/decomposing theorem is compatible with the knowledge flow theorem if the fixed set
Fp satisfies the single source axiom. In Appendix A, we show that this is equivalent to assuming that it is
hard to solve the equation x = w(x) where w(x) = Sa(Eb(G(EG(Sc(x))(d)))) is some function composed of
G, E , and S .
6 Primitives
We now present a sample library of composing/decomposing primitives, which is sufficient for modeling
a wide range of security protocols. The library includes the standard cryptographic primitives: encryp-
tion/decryption, signing, pair/set construction, nonce generation, and hashing. It also provides a special rule
primitive that allows protocol rules to be modeled in the composing/decomposing pattern.
6.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Encryption/Decryption Public key encryption [31] consists of a (probabilistic) encryption algorithm, a
decryption algorithm, and a (probabilistic) key-generating algorithm. Given some security parameter, the
key-generating algorithm generates a public-secret key pair. We model p’s private key SK(p) as belonging
to p’s initial knowledge, (p,SK(p)) ∈ k0. We model the public key as a one-way function of the secret
key, i.e., PK(p) = G(SK(p)). Hence, one can compute a corresponding public key from the given secret
2There exists a unique maximal fixed set since the union of two fixed sets is again a fixed set.
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key but not vice versa. Letting e denote the principal representing public key encryption, we can express
key-generation as follows: for all p ∈ P and s ∈ V , (e,G(s), p, {(p, s)}) ∈ R. If we project this family of
rules on Oscar, we obtain
∀s∈V [{s} → G(s)]. (8)
Given a plaintext x and a public key G(s), the encryption algorithm computes the cipher-
text3 EG(s)(x). Thus, the parameterized rule for encryption is, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V ,
(e, EG(s)(x), p, {(p,G(s)), (p, x)}) ∈ R. Projecting the rule on Oscar yields
∀s,x∈V [{x,G(s)} → EG(s)(x)]. (9)
Given a ciphertext EG(s)(x) and the secret key s, the decryption algorithm computes the plaintext x.
Hence, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V , (e, x, p, {(p, s), (p, EG(s)(x))}) ∈ R and
∀s,x∈V [{s, EG(s)(x)} → x]. (10)
Signing We can model digital signatures [31] by extending e with the rules of the form
(e,Ss(x), p, {(p, s), (p, x)}) ∈ R, for all p ∈ P and s, x ∈ V , which translate into
∀v∈V [{x, s} → Ss(x)]. (11)
In practice, the principal who receives x and its signature Ss(x) can verify the signature by using the public
key G(s). In our model, it is sufficient to note that knowledge of y = Ss(x) already verifies that y is a
signature of x, signed by using the secret key s. That is, the principal who obtained y from e knows both s
and x.
Symmetric key encryption is modeled by (9) and (10) whereG(s) is replaced by s and where s represents
the symmetric key. We can extend this definition with (11) to include message authentication codes (MACs).
Pairing/Set Construction Let t be a principal such that a communication rule (t, v, pa, ka) is in R if and
only if one of the following holds for v ∈ V , pa ∈ P , and ka ∈ K: (i) v = (x, y) and ka = {(pa, x), (pa, y)}
for some x, y ∈ V , (ii) ka = {(pa, (v, y))} for some y ∈ V , or (iii) ka = {(pa, (x, v))} for some x ∈ V .
Projected on Oscar, this set of rules becomes
∀x,y∈V [{x, y} → (x, y)], (12)
∀x,y∈V [{(x, y)} → x], (13)
∀x,y∈V [{(x, y)} → y]. (14)
Replacing (x, y) by {x, y} in (12-14) turns t into a primitive that generates sets of cardinality 2.
Nonce Generation Let I(p) ∈ V represent the public identity of p (the identity function I em-
beds P in V ). We model nonce generation with the nonce primitive n and the parameterized rule
∀p∈P,v∈V (n,N (v,I(p)), p, {(p, v)}) ∈ R, which translates into
∀p∈O,v∈V [{v} → N (v,I(p))]. (15)
The dependence of n’s output on I(p) ensures that p cannot learn other principals’ nonces from n. The
parameter v represents the seed from which a pseudo random nonce is generated. If a protocol stipulates
that a principal p needs to generate a new nonce in response to a received message m, then v is taken to be
equal to m. For the first nonce of a protocol, we take v to be the empty string ǫ.
Hashing We define the primitive h for calculating hashes H(x) with the family of rules
∀p∈P,x∈V (h,H(x), p, {(p, x)}) ∈ R and
∀x∈V [{x} → H(x)]. (16)
3If the algorithm is probabilistic (for example in ElGamal encryption) then the ciphertext EG(s)(x; r) is also a function of some
random value r (uniformly) drawn by the algorithm.
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6.2 The Rule Primitive
Protocol rules do not compute new values; rather, they model the transmission of values computed by the
primitives. We can therefore embed protocol rules into the initial state of knowledge as follows.
With each (parameterized) protocol rule x → y, we associate the value |x → y| ∈ V . This value is
composed/decomposed by the rule primitive r via the parameterized rules
∀p∈P,x,y∈V (r, |x→ y|, p, {(p, x), (p, y)}) ∈ R and
∀p∈P,x,y∈V (r, y, p, {(p, |x → y|), (p, x)}) ∈ R,
whose projected forms are
∀x,y∈V [{x, y} → |x→ y|] and (17)
∀x,y∈V [{x, |x→ y|} → y]. (18)
We represent each protocol rule x → y with the initial knowledge (o, |x → y|). Oscar can now use
(18) to learn y from |x → y| if he knows x. For example, the following addition to k0, together with (18),
simulates the rule (3) of the Needham-Schroeder protocol:
∀p∈{a,b},p′∈{a,b}∪O,v∈V
[
(o, |{EPK(p)(N (ǫ,I(p)), v))} → EPK(p′)(v)|) ∈ k0
]
.
6.3 Summary
The rules (8)-(18) define a library of primitives—e, t, n, h and r—that are composing/decomposing accord-
ing to Theorem 11. The following assumptions are implicit in their definitions:
The Collision Free Axioms It is hard to compute collisions of the composition rules (8), (9), (11), (12),
(15), (16) and (17). Therefore, we model these rules as injective functions that are mutually free of
collisions; that is, they satisfy the local and global collision free axioms.
The Single Source Axiom It is hard to compute fixed points of functional compositions of the rules (8),
(9), (11), (12), (15), (16) and (17). The principals e, t, n, h and r hence satisfy the single-source
axiom.
Cryptographic Primitive Properties It is hard to compute the inverses that are not encoded by the decom-
position rules (10), (13), and (14). The rules (8-14) represent Oscar’s computational means in The
Dolev-Yao intruder model [14]. This assumes perfect cryptography: the set of values is supposed to
be a free algebra.
Collision freeness and perfect cryptography are routinely assumed when reasoning about security pro-
tocols. To the best of our knowledge, however, the necessity of assuming the single source axiom has not
been recognized before. We discovered it using the Alloy Analyzer [23], a general purpose model finder, to
check a security theorem about knowledge flows in the CPUFs renewal protocol [19, 18]: in the absence of
the axiom, the Analyzer generates a false counterexample to the theorem based on a fixed value that satisfies
the equation x = Es(x).
7 Related Work
The first formalisms designed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols are belief logics such as BAN
logic [8], used by the Convince tool [25] with the HOL theorem prover [22], and its generalizations (GNY
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[21], AT [3], and SVO logic [41] which the C3PO tool [13] employs with the Isabelle theorem prover [37]).
Belief logics are difficult to use since the logical form of a protocol does not correspond to the protocol itself
in an obvious way. Almost indistinguishable formulations of the same problem lead to different results. It
is also hard to know if a formulation is over constrained or if any important assumptions are missing. BAN
logic and its derivatives cannot deal with security flaws resulting from interleaving of protocol steps [7] and
cannot express any properties of protocols other than authentication [28]. To overcome these limitations,
the knowledge flow formalism has, like other approaches [27, 33, 11, 40, 30], a concrete operational model
of protocol execution. Our model also includes a description of how the honest participants in the protocol
behave and a description of how an adversary can interfere with the execution of the protocol.
Specialized model checkers such as Casper [27], Murφ [33], Brutus [11], TAPS [12], and ProVerif [1]
have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. These tools are based on state space exploration
which leads to an exponential complexity. Athena [40] is based on a modification of the strand space model
[16]. Even though it reduces the state space explosion problem, it remains exponential. Multiset rewriting
[15] in combination with tree automata is used in Timbuk [17]. The relation between multiset rewriting
and strand spaces is analyzed in [9]. The relation between multiset rewriting and process algebras [32, 2] is
analyzed in [5].
Proof building tools such as NRL, based on Prolog [30], have also been helpful for analyzing security
protocols. However, they are not fully automatic and often require extensive user intervention. Model
checkers lead to completely automated tools which generate counterexamples if a protocol is flawed. For
theorem-proving-based approaches, counterexamples are hard to produce.
For completeness, we note that if the initial knowledge of the intruder consists of a finite number of
explicit (non-parameterized, non-symbolic) values, then a polynomial time intruder detection algorithm can
be shown to exist using a generalization of the proof normalization arguments [29, 4, 20], which were
employed in [6, 35] and have been implemented in the framework [36] (our two phase theorem can also
be used to derive a polynomial time algorithm). However, in practice, the initial knowledge of an intruder
is unbounded and represented by a finite number of parameterized sets, each having an infinite number of
elements.
8 Concluding Remarks
We introduced knowledge flow analysis, a new framework for reasoning about knowledge in cryptographic
protocols. The key advantage of the knowledge flow approach over other formalisms is its simplicity and
flexibility. It is simple in the sense that the underlying mathematics is straightforward and elementary; it
does not require any specialized background (in logic). It is flexible in the sense that the same library of
cryptographic primitives can be used to model different protocols and that the security of a complex scheme
involving multiple protocols can be verified. Knowledge flow analysis allows modeling of confidentiality
and authenticity via a wide range of primitives such as pairing, union, hashing, symmetric key encryption,
public key encryption, MACs and digital signatures.
Our formalism derives its simplicity from being just sufficiently expressive to enable modeling of prac-
tical cryptographic protocols. In particular, existentials [15] cannot be encoded as knowledge flows; existen-
tials are implicitly modeled in Oscar’s initial knowledge. NP-hardness proofs which use (existential) Horn
clause reduction [15] or SAT3 reduction [39] are not applicable to knowledge flow analysis.
Our formalism leads to a rigorous mathematical treatment and generalization of the two-phase theory
[15, 10] which is used to efficiently verify protocols. Our treatment reveals the necessary and sufficient
collision free and single source axioms; it is hard to compute collisions and fixed points of compositions of
cryptographic primitives. To the best of our knowledge the necessity of assuming the single source axiom
has not been recognized before.
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A Fixed Sets and Orderings
To prove Theorem 11, we define a sequence of subsets which we use to define a partial ordering and to
characterize a fixed set.
Definition 12 Let S be locally collision free with respect to C , D, and Wi, i ∈ C ∪D. We define Sn ⊆ V
recursively by S−1 = ∅,
S0 = V − Im(S) = V − {xi : i ∈ C and there exists a tuple (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S},
and, for n ≥ 0,
Sn+1 = Sn ∪
{
xi :
i ∈ C and there exists a (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S
such that xj ∈ Sn for j ∈Wi
}
.
We define S∞ = {v ∈ V : v ∈ Sn for some n ≥ 0}.
We first show in Lemma 14 that V − S∞ is a fixed set. We start with a result which we use throughout
the whole proof.
Lemma 13 Let i ∈ C , (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S, and xi ∈ S∞. Then (i) xi ∈ Sn+1 − Sn for some n ≥ 0 and (ii)
xj ∈ Sn for all j ∈Wi and there exists a h ∈Wi such that xh ∈ Sn − Sn−1.
Proof. (i) Since i ∈ C , xi 6∈ S0 which proves n ≥ 0. (ii) Let k ≥ 0 be the smallest index for which xj ∈ Sk
for all j ∈Wi. Then, there exists an index h ∈Wi such that xh ∈ Sk − Sk−1. Notice that xi ∈ Sk+1 by the
definition of Sk+1. Therefore, if k < n then xi ∈ Sk+1 ⊆ Sn, contradicting xi ∈ Sn+1 − Sn. This proves
n ≤ k.
From the definition of xi ∈ Sn+1 − Sn we infer that there exists a t ∈ C , (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ S such that
xi = yt and yj ∈ Sn for j ∈ Wt. Since i ∈ C , t ∈ C , and xi = yt, (6) yields xh ∈ {xj : j ∈ Wi} = {yj :
j ∈Wt} ⊆ Sn. From xh ∈ Sk − Sk−1, we infer n ≥ k. We conclude n = k which proves the lemma.

Lemma 14 V − S∞ is a fixed set for p.
Proof. Let (p, v, pa, ka) ∈ R with v ∈ V − S∞. From (7) we infer that there exists an i ∈ C ∪ D and
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S such that v = xi and ka = {(pa, xj) : j ∈ Wi}. If i ∈ C and xj ∈ S∞ for all j ∈ Wi,
then, by the definition of S∞, xi ∈ S∞, which contradicts xi = v ∈ V − S∞. Hence, if i ∈ C then
xj ∈ V − S∞ for some j ∈Wi.
If i ∈ D, then (5) shows the existence of a h ∈ C with i ∈ Wh and h ∈ Wi. From i ∈ Wh and h ∈ C
we infer that if xh ∈ S∞ then, by Lemma 13 (ii), xi ∈ S∞, which contradicts xi = v ∈ V − S∞. Hence,
xj ∈ V − S∞ for some j ∈Wi.

Let Fp be the maximal fixed set such that Fp ⊆ V − S0 = Im(S). Then Lemma 14 proves that
V − S∞ ⊆ Fp, hence, V − Fp ⊆ S∞. Notice that X →p x (defined by using RF ) implies that there exists
a rule (p, x, o, kσ) ∈ R such that X = {v : (o, v) ∈ kσ} and X ∩ Fp = ∅. Since Fp is a fixed set, x ∈ Fp
contradicts X ∩ Fp = ∅. Thus, for X →p x, both x 6∈ Fp and X ∩ Fp = ∅, that is x ∈ S∞ and X ⊆ S∞.
Sets Sn lead to the partial ordering
[v ≺p w] ≡ [v ∈ Sa − Sa−1 and w ∈ Sb − Sb−1 for some 0 ≤ a < b].
Notice that {v : ∃x∈V [x ≺p v]} ⊆ V − S0 = Im(S). Theorem 11 follows from Lemmas 15-16, which
prove that p is composing/decomposing.
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Lemma 15 Let (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S with {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi. Then, {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi is composing if
and only if i ∈ C .
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ C . Since {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi, xi ∈ S∞. By Lemma 13 (i), xi ∈ Sn+1 − Sn
for some n ≥ 0, by Lemma 13 (ii), {xj : j ∈ Wi} ≺p xi, which proves that {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi is
composing.
Suppose that {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi is composing, that is, {xj : j ∈ Wi} ≺p xi. If i ∈ D, then by (5)
there exists a h ∈ C with h ∈ Wi and i ∈ Wh. Since {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi, xh ∈ S∞ and by Lemma 13
(i), xh ∈ Sn+1 − Sn for some n ≥ 0. By Lemma 13 (ii), xi ∈ {xj : j ∈Wh} ⊆ Sn, hence, xi ≺p xh. This
contradicts {xj : j ∈Wi} ≺p xi and we conclude that i 6∈ D, that is, i ∈ C .

Lemma 16 Let (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S with {xj : j ∈Wi} →p xi. Then, {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi is decomposing
if and only if i ∈ D.
Proof. We prove {xj : j ∈ Wi} →p xi is decomposing for i ∈ D. Then, the lemma follows from Lemma
15 since i 6∈ D ⇐⇒ i ∈ C lead to composing rules. By (5), there exists a h ∈ C with h ∈ Wi and i ∈ Wh.
By Lemma 13 (i), xh ∈ Sn+1 − Sn for some n ≥ 0. By Lemma 13 (ii) xi ∈ Sn, hence, xi ≺p xh.
To prove the lemma we show that xh controlsp xi. Let {yj : j ∈ Wt} →p yt = xh be composing,
hence, t ∈ C by Lemma 15. Then (6) with h ∈ C and xh = yt states {xj : j ∈Wh} = {yj : j ∈Wt}. This
proves xi ∈ {yj : j ∈Wt} and we conclude that xh controlsp xi.

The composing/decomposing theorem is compatible with the knowledge flow theorem if Fp satisfies the
single source axiom. We need to show that it is hard to compute an element v0 ∈ Fp. First, observe that
locally collision free sets often satisfy the following condition that is slightly stronger than (6): for each
i ∈ C there exists an injective function ci such that ci((xj)j∈Wi) = xi for (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ S and such that
the image of ci has an empty intersection with the images of cj , j 6= i; Im(S) is equal to the union of the
images of ci, i ∈ C .
Since Fp ⊆ Im(S), v0 = ci(x1, . . . , xm) for some i ∈ C . Since Fp is a fixed set, v1 ∈ Fp for some
v1 = xj . Thus, v0 = q0(v1) for some function derived from ci. By continuing this argument we obtain a
sequence of elements v0 = q0(v1), v1 = q1(v2), . . . In practise, the domain of the functions ci, i ∈ C , has a
finite size. Thus there exist j < h with vj = vh, that is, vj is a fixed point of the equation x = w(x) where
w(x) = qj(qj+1(. . . qh−1(x) . . .)) is some function composed of ci, i ∈ C . So, the single source axiom is
satisfied if it is hard to compute compositions q0(q1(. . . qj−1(x) . . .)) with x = w(x).
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